Partnership plus: on the future of the NATO-Ukraine relationship by Kaim, Markus
www.ssoar.info
Partnership plus: on the future of the NATO-Ukraine
relationship
Kaim, Markus
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Kaim, M. (2014). Partnership plus: on the future of the NATO-Ukraine relationship. (SWP Comment, 28/2014). Berlin:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://nbn-
resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-396362
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
 Stiftung  
Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute  
for International and 
Security Affairs  
SW
P
 C
om
m
en
ts
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Partnership Plus: On the Future of the 
NATO-Ukraine Relationship 
Markus Kaim 
The aftermath of the political turmoil in February and the Russian annexation of 
Crimea in March leave Ukraine politically, economically and militarily weakened. 
A lack of cohesion within Ukrainian society and centrifugal forces in its regions only 
serve to complicate matters even more. The country will require foreign assistance, 
not least in guarding its territorial integrity and political sovereignty. Here there is 
an important role for NATO. It is currently unclear what thoughts should guide the 
Alliance as it realigns its relationship with Ukraine. 
 
From the Western perspective, the question 
of what security support or ties NATO is pre-
pared to grant Ukraine can remain open for 
a while longer. But procrastination comes 
easy as the Ukrainian government has an-
nounced that seeking NATO membership is 
not presently a priority. 
Ukraine has not benefited from non-
alignment. Its membership of a “security 
no-man’s land” between NATO and Moscow 
did not have the predicted stabilising effect 
during the crisis. In view of these facts, the 
NATO governments have no alternative but 
to revise their ideas about order and secu-
rity on the Alliance’s eastern periphery. 
On the State of 
NATO-Ukraine Relations 
Relations between Kiev and the North 
Atlantic Alliance have been lacking sub-
stance and dynamism in recent years. Both 
sides share responsibility for the absence of 
a clear development perspective. Although 
NATO formally continued its open door 
policy launched at the Bucharest summit 
in April 2008, under which Ukrainian mem-
bership is formally possible, it refrained 
from pursuing that option at the behest 
of individual members (above all Germany 
and France) and out of consideration for 
Russia. 
On the other hand, after taking office in 
2010 President Viktor Yanukovych officially 
renounced Ukraine’s accession plans and 
replaced them with a policy of non-align-
ment. Relations with NATO were to con-
tinue below the membership threshold. 
Since then both sides have downgraded 
their relationship to a largely technical 
level, on the basis of the Charter on a Dis-
tinctive Partnership signed by NATO and 
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 Kiev in 1997. The Charter forms the politi-
cal foundation for concrete collaboration 
in the NATO-Ukraine Commission. In recent 
years cooperation involved two main areas: 
firstly, Ukrainian contributions to NATO 
crisis management operations, principally 
in Kosovo but also Afghanistan, which 
were intended to enhance interoperability 
between Ukrainian and NATO forces; and 
secondly, reform of Ukraine’s security sec-
tor to bring it up to Western standards. 
NATO’s Immediate Response 
to the Crisis 
The NATO foreign ministers agreed in 
Brussels on 1 April 2014 to continue the 
policy of technical cooperation below the 
level of membership. They reiterated their 
responsibility to Ukraine and announced 
“immediate and longer-term measures in 
order to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to pro-
vide for its own security”. Although they 
cited the existing partnership format, they 
failed to mention the open door policy 
instituted in 2008. The agreed measures are 
also rather vague: NATO intends to lend sup-
port to the reform of the Ukrainian armed 
forces, and NATO experts travelled to Kiev 
in April to assess “tactical military equip-
ment” and “critical infrastructure”. But 
despite expectations in Kiev, NATO has to 
date excluded direct military support such 
as arms deliveries. Through this cautious 
approach, NATO members hope to demon-
strate immediate solidarity with Ukraine 
without offering Russia any pretext for 
further escalation, in order to avoid dis-
rupting diplomatic efforts to contain or 
resolve the crisis. 
A Paradigm Shift on Security  
Two fundamental tenets that had guided 
Western security policy with respect to 
Ukraine and Russia have been challenged 
or negated by the Russian annexation of 
Crimea, namely: 
1.  The 1994 Budapest Memorandum and 
the anchoring of neutrality in Ukrainian 
law in 2010 suffice to guarantee the coun-
try’s political sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. 
2.  By refraining from pursuing Ukrain-
ian membership, NATO secures Russia’s 
cooperation in questions of international 
security in general and in the Euro-Atlantic 
space in particular. 
The question of what pillars NATO’s 
future Ukraine policy will be built upon is 
still open. Four thoughts should guide the 
decision-making process: 
 
1.  The primacy of self-determination 
Whatever is presently discussed in Western 
capitals, the right of the Ukrainian popu-
lation to freely choose its security orienta-
tion must be placed firmly front and centre 
once again. As Western governments work 
to reach an understanding with Russia on 
the ethnic/territorial conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine, this must not be permitted to 
create a situation where a “concert of great 
powers” agrees or excludes alliance options 
– and thus stake out spheres of influence – 
over the heads of the Ukrainians. Western 
governments cannot accuse Russia of being 
stuck in outdated nineteenth-century for-
eign policy notions while at the same time 
themselves seeking to assign Ukraine a spe-
cific security status or granting Moscow a 
veto over the question of Kiev’s alignment. 
 
2.  “Finnish model” rather 
than “Finlandisation” 
Certain US academics have floated the idea 
of a Finlandisation of Ukraine, in the sense of 
neutrality anchored by treaty or (depending 
on the proposal) even in the constitution. 
This status, according to its proponents, 
would take account of Russian concerns 
and interests and to that extent have a de-
escalating and stabilising effect. 
Such proposals build on Finland’s secu-
rity status during the Cold War, which was 
characterised not only by formal non-align-
ment, but also by political equidistance to 
Moscow and Brussels/Washington. As the 
price of its territorial integrity Finland ulti-
mately accepted strong Soviet influence, 
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 manifested for example in the Finno-Soviet 
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and 
Mutual Assistance of 1948. After Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea in violation of the 
1994 Budapest Memorandum, any basis for 
a Finlandisation of (the rest of) Ukraine has 
evaporated. Preserving the territorial status 
quo, as the principle upon which Finlandi-
sation would have to rest, is not exactly the 
essence of current Russian policy. 
Instead, the Finnish model is a conceivable 
option for Ukraine, concretely Helsinki’s 
security policy since the 1990s. Although 
Finland remains outside all military alli-
ances, it is not neutral politically. During 
the past two decades Finland has left no 
doubts as to its security orientation and 
Western ties. Helsinki has participated very 
actively in NATO’s Partnership for Peace 
programme since 1994, and cooperates 
through the Nordic Defence Cooperation 
with the NATO members Denmark, Norway 
and Iceland (as well as Sweden). Finally, 
Finland has been a member of the EU since 
1995, participates in the CFSP/CSDP, and 
is obliged by the solidarity clause in the 
Lisbon Treaty to come to the aid of any 
member-state that suffers a terrorist attack 
in its territory. Continuing non-alignment, 
deeper cooperation with NATO members 
and a clear Western political orientation 
could potentially form the three decisive 
pillars of future Ukrainian security policy. 
 
3.  Full NATO membership: 
preserve the status quo 
While it might appear tempting to respond 
to Russia’s actions in Crimea and Eastern 
Ukraine by reviving or forcing the option 
of full NATO membership for Ukraine, 
there must be doubt as to whether the 
NATO states possess the political will and 
military capacity to honour the mutual 
defence clause. 
Two other arguments are much more 
significant. In the present situation, Mos-
cow would perceive such a move by NATO 
as a deliberate escalation, and probably in 
response terminate all cooperation towards 
containing or resolving the Ukraine crisis, 
as pursued by the OSCE and other media-
tors. Not least, such a step also risks further 
exacerbating the already discernible politi-
cal polarisation of Ukrainian society. In 
that context it would appear advisable for 
NATO to leave the option of full member-
ship for Ukraine to one side for the moment. 
But at the same time there is no reason to 
fall behind the Bucharest assurances of 
2008. That would call into question NATO’s 
credibility and signalise to Russia that the 
alliance was willing to cave in to Russian 
pressure. 
 
4.  Export stability 
There is a danger of Ukraine losing more 
territory to Russia through secession or 
annexation, the state monopoly of armed 
force eroding even further, or the country 
spiralling into civil war. Such scenarios 
would have immediate security implica-
tions for Ukraine’s four NATO neighbours: 
Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. 
Indirectly, the destabilising effect of such a 
development would affect all the Alliance’s 
members. The main task in the coming 
months will therefore be to reassure the 
eastern members that the alliance’s secu-
rity promises remain valid, while exporting 
stability and security to its eastern periph-
ery. The objective must now be to seek 
institutional and political arrangements 
to contain intra-Ukrainian strife and the 
Moscow/Kiev conflict as rapidly as possible. 
The longer-term objective must be to offer 
Ukraine a stable security anchoring. The 
alternative would be a politically fragile 
and disorientated country functioning as 
a source of permanent instability. 
For a Partnership-Plus Format 
NATO already maintains a formalised 
cooperation arrangement with Ukraine, 
which needs to be upheld in modified form. 
While this has to date concentrated on sup-
porting the country’s internal transforma-
tion, NATO’s ambition must now reach 
out further to encompass (re)building and 
strengthening the country’s security forces. 
SWP Comments 28 
June 2014 
3 
 In view of the circumstances outlined 
above, the Ukrainian government will not 
initially be able to depend on external 
security promises. Instead it will have to 
ensure its own political sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. NATO can provide 
assistance in two respects: 
Militarily NATO should continue to sup-
port reform of the defence sector and push 
for the political and financial choices that 
are necessary to create effective armed 
forces. The upcoming large-scale Western 
aid payments should be tied to progress 
on good governance. Joint manoeuvres, 
support in training Ukrainian armed forces 
and access to modern defensive weapons 
systems should complement the aid 
package. 
Politically the Alliance should upgrade 
the NATO-Ukraine Commission. Article 4 of 
the NATO Treaty provides for consultations 
if a member believes its territorial integrity, 
political independence or security to be 
threatened. Even without full membership, 
an analogous arrangement for Ukraine 
would be an important sign of NATO’s will-
ingness to secure security and stability on 
its eastern periphery. 
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